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SYMPOSIUM
GETTING BEYOND CYNICISM: NEW
THEORIES OF THE REGULATORY STATE
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree
of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualitiesin human nature
which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.
-Federalist No. 551

FOREWORD: POST-PUBLIC CHOICE?
Cynthia R. Farina&JeffreyJ. Rachlinski

Few problems facing the scholar concerned with issues of government structure are more important or difficult than ... finding a way past the grim
political accounts of government offered by the right and the left to a state2
ment that leaves room for genuinely public ends of action.

Cynicism dominates contemporary discussion of American government. Politicians and public interest groups alike decry the political system as being awash with money, giving massive influence to a
privileged few. The media run endless stories of wasteful government
programs, which are commonly tied to the undue influence of one or
another political insider. Well-publicized claims that important social
legislation on health care, tobacco, and handguns has been derailed
by narrow interest groups further exacerbate public distrust of government. Voters periodically express their outrage at the system by electing outsiders such as Jesse "the Governor" Ventura, and by supporting
quirky would-be reformers such as John McCain, Steve Forbes, and
Ross Perot. Pollsters report bleakly that citizen respect for and trust in
the institutions of government is at an historic low.
In this sea of popular disillusionment, it should perhaps be no
surprise that the same currents animate academic discussion of government. Indeed, scholarly distrust of the regulatory state predates
the current wave of public suspicion and is, in many ways, deeper and
more entrenched. With the emergence of public choice theory in the
I

THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

2 Peter L. Strauss, Sunstein, Statutes, and the Common Law-ReconcilingMarkets,the Communal Impulse, and the Mammoth State, 89 MICH. L. REV. 907, 908 (1991) (reviewing CASS
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEVNG THE REGULATORY STATE (1990)).
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mid-1980s, academic analyses of public policy found both vehicle for
and justification of a profound skepticism about the capacity of government to advance the public interest effectively.
Public choice theory-at least as conventionally deployed in legal
scholarship-refers to a set of premises and hypotheses having, as its
core, the conviction that well-organized groups, seeking to advance
their members' self-interest at someone else's cost, tend to win out in
the public policy market. Derived from rational choice models of
human behavior, it posits the legislator seeking to maximize his
chances of reelection, who behaves most solicitously towards those interest groups that give him most support. Similarly, it presumes that
interest groups (composed of rational individual members) do not expend their resources seeking legislation that benefits others. If all interests competed equally in the political marketplace for legislative
favor, the result might look like the pluralist model of democratic
decisionmaking. However, public choice adds the observation that organizing is costly-and the consequent prediction that effective lobbying groups will form only when the benefits the individual can expect
from collective political activity outweigh the costs of organizing. This
cost-benefit calculus tends to work in favor of interests shared by a
small number of citizens, in a homogenous fashion, with relatively
large and obvious individual effects. It tends to work against interests
shared by many citizens, in diverse ways, with relatively small or nonobvious individual effects. Thus, the phenomena of self-serving lobbying and legislative capture, which are the natural products of rational
behavior by citizens and elected officials, will produce public policy
systematically skewed towards narrow interests at the expense of overall social welfare.
This model of democratic government has dominated academic
discussion of the regulatory state for nearly two decades; even legal
scholars who do not consider themselves public choice practitioners
work in its shadow. Current debates about the validity and best practices of regulation-including the appropriate role of Congress, agencies, the President, and the courts-build on the foundation laid
down by public choice theory. Because this foundation itself rests on
an account of human behavior as clear-eyed, single-minded egocentricity, it is small wonder that the resulting theoretical edifices offer
3
precious little "room for genuinely public ends of action."
Increasingly, however, the scholar concerned with the structure
and performance of civic institutions has a choice about how to model
the human subjects who actuate those institutions. Work in the behavioral sciences has produced accounts of human behavior that bear
3

Id. at 908.
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little resemblance to the classic homo economicus. Whereas the conventional public choice story features the individual as relentlessly effective promoter of self-interest, newer social-science models portray
people as both less inexorably self-centered in what they want, and
more reliably fallible in how they try to get it. Put somewhat differently, public choice posits limits on human motivation but not human
intelligence, whereas behavioral research suggests exactly the opposite. Social scientists are discovering, for example, how group norms
function to induce other-regarding action even at the expense of selfinterest. More broadly, research into human judgment has revealed
that the success with which human decisionmakers pursue any goal
will be significantly tempered by the finite nature of cognitive resources. In short, the model of single-minded, self-centered, avaricious "Chicago man" is slowly being replaced in the behavioral
sciences by conflicted, gregarious, generous "Berkeley man."
This new learning about human behavior will inevitably filter into
models of government. Indeed, its impact can be discerned in Vice
President Gore's "Reinventing Government" initiative: Part of that initiative encourages the use of voluntary compliance measures that put
some faith in corporate managers' willingness to do "the right thing,"
even at the expense of their bottom line. Likewise, the public law
literature is beginning to turn from a monolithic view of government-in which the prime directive is to control the self-interest of
both private and public actors-to one of governance, in which the
regulated and the regulators work together towards ends that promote a common good.
This Symposium explores the world of theorizing about government that lies beyond cynicism. The papers discuss the strengths and
weaknesses of new models for understanding and designing institutions of public policymaking. They review how emerging accounts of
human behavior might affect our assessment of such administrative
and structural constitutional issues as the proper role for judicial review of administrative agency action, the nondelegation doctrine, the
role of executive oversight of administrative agencies, and the prospects for partnership and cooperation between regulators and
regulatees.
Like good scientists, however, we begin the Symposium with a paper that questions our underlying assumptions. Our esteemed colleague Jonathan Macey challenges the premise that cynicism is
undesirable. 4 He asserts that, rather than being a corrosive agent that
enervates democratic processes, cynicism is crucial to preserving selfgovernance. Professor Macey observes that many of the worst societal
4 Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory, 87 CoRNELL L. REv. 280 (2002).
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abuses arise when the citizenry blindly places its faith in public officials. Elected leaders, he argues, have an interest in convincing the
public of their good intentions, regardless of their true motivations.
Taking up the challenge to integrate new accounts of human behavior
into models of government, Professor Macey insists that Berkeley man
is even more susceptible to the chicanery of public officials than is
Chicago man. He worries that politicians in fact depend upon deficiencies of human judgment in the populace to further their own,
self-serving ends. Without a healthy skepticism of those in power, Professor Macey concludes, citizens are all the more vulnerable to predation conducted in the name of good government. For this reason, he
argues that scholars should always adopt the most cynical explanation
of government behavior, an analytical presumption he dubs "Macey's
razor."
No two contributions to the Symposium contrast more clearly
than this argument and the Article that follows by Edward Rubin. 5 In
the Macey worldview, government is an independent, even alien, entity to be constrained by its citizenry's beliefs. In the Rubin worldview,
government is a product of citizens' beliefs. Answering the call to investigate the consequences of displacing rational self-interest as the
mainspring of civic behavior, Professor Rubin proposes that the principal motivation underlying human action is a quest for meaning.
With the intellectual breadth and elegance that have marked all his
writing on public law theory, he argues that people struggle to create
meaningful purpose and direction in both their public and private
lives. Consequently, the modern administrative state is "not the result
of inadvertence, or a mysterious cabal, or the perversion of government by special interest groups, but a structure of meaning which citizens share."'6 Professor Rubin contends that, in post-industrial
democratic societies, people construct government to remove impediments to the social and economic life they wish to realize. Although
he admits that the quest for meaning does not always provide stable
predictions of human behavior, it nevertheless accounts for many of
the behaviors that public choice theorists find problematic, such as
voting and the empirically demonstrated role of ideology in the decisions of public officials. Professor Rubin thus provides us with a portrait of the administrative state drawn not as public coercion
harnessed by private greed, but rather as one of many "problem-solving instrumentalities" through which people seek to realize their ma7
terial and moral commitments.
5 Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern State:
Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 309 (2002).
6 Id. at 361.
7 See id. at 313-28.
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Throughout this volume, the commentors keep the analysis honest with constructive assessments of the theme; this is particularly true
in the three Comments on the Macey and Rubin Articles.
Terry Moe, with his signature focus on methodological integrity,
argues for the fundamental importance of empirical verification.8 He
asserts that a theory of government, whether it relies on rational selfinterest or otherwise, has little claim to social science attention unless
it is capable of being tested for its capacity to explain and predict realworld political behavior. Because "the basic thrust [of social science]
is always toward choosing theories with greater truth value,"9 all theories "have to win a competition based on truth."'1 Professor Moe
lauds both Articles as "interesting and provocative"" but questions
whether democracy, citizens, or social scientists would be better off
adopting either the Macey or the Rubin worldview.
Saul Levmore would not have the volume proceed without a
friendly reminder of the valuable contributions public choice theory
has made. 12 Public choice, he contends, is not so much a cynical account of government as it is a "study of how we do the best we can"
with our public institutions. 13 With his distinctive blend of unstinting
critical candor and fundamental optimism, Professor Levmore insists
that public choice has proven its worth-particularly in analyzing majority and other voting rules-and he urges those who believe in the
potential of government institutions to embrace its insights into minimizing "[d] estructive strategic behavior."'14 Ultimately, he advocates a
stance of pragmatic eclecticism: Public choice (or, one gathers, any
other theory) should be understood as one tool in the intellectual
workbox-to be used where it gives purchase on the particular problem, and to be set aside when a different analytical instrument is more
apt.
Yvette Barksdale eloquently reminds us that the true purpose of
government is furthering the welfare of its citizens but observes, with
concern, that conflicting democratic values make it "so easy to trash
government," if one chooses to. 15 She points out that it matters little
to ordinary people whether they are sufficiently cynical about their
government if it is failing to meet their basic human needs. Likewise,
8

Terry M. Moe, Cynicism and Political Theory, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 362 (2002).

9

Id. at 365.
Id.

10
11
12

Id. at 374.
Saul Levmore, From Cynicism to Positive Theory in Public Choice, 87 CORNELL L. REv.

375 (2002).
13
14

Id.

Id. at 378.
15 Yvette M. Barksdale, Cynicism, Phenomenology, and the Problem of Paradox:Dilemmas of
Public Law Discours4 87 CORNELL L. REv. 384, 387 (2002).
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people who look to the government to provide economic security are
not searching for meaning, but for food and rent. Professor Barksdale's Comment uncovers the normative tensions that make optimistic theorizing about government so difficult, while at the same time
keeping the Symposium grounded in the needs of real citizens for
social and economic security.
Like Professor Macey, principal-paper author David Spence challenges a basic premise of the Symposium-although he would be
among the first to reject the strategy of Macey's razor. Professor
Spence acknowledges that cynical forms of public choice theorizing
have dominated legal scholarship but insists that public choice methods need not inevitably produce darkly anti-government conclusions. 16 Tracing the evolution of public choice as practiced by
political scientists, he argues that the theory has become more
nuanced and flexible; in particular, it has moved beyond the motivational assumption of universal self-interest to "the subtler question of
whether human beings can act rationally in the broader sense. ' 17 Professor Spence demonstrates the operation of this "neo-Progressive"
public choice by reassessing the problem of congressional delegation
to administrative agencies. In the conventional public choice account
familiar to legal scholars, delegation allows concentrated groups to
capture an agency and use it to further their private interests at the
public's expense. In a previous article, Professor Spence used economic modeling to demonstrate that, to the contrary, administrative
decisionmakers are likely to select the public policy the median voter
would prefer if she had full information and the opportunity to deliberate.' 8 In his Symposium Article, he supplements this argument by
exploring why, even under identical assumptions about the motives
of bureaucrats and legislators, legislatures are more likely than agencies to produce policy that strays from the well-informed median
voter's preferences-at least with respect to the kind of lower-salience
issues that are the bulk of regulatory policymaking. In so doing, Professor Spence advances his groundbreaking work of providing an economically based case for trust that the regulatory state can serve the
public interest.
Our colleague Gregory Alexander, a distinguished contributor to
the literature on republicanism in American political theory, 19 applauds this "heroic" effort to "appropriate" public choice theory to the
16

David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 397

(2002).
17
18

Id. at 414.
David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Casefor the Administrative State, 89

GEORGETOWN L.J. 97 (2000).
19
See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT

&

PROPRIET.

COMPETING VISIONS OF

1776-1970 (1997).
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service of a progressive, pro-regulatory agenda. 20 However, his Comment worries that, daring and well-executed as Professor Spence's
strategy is, it is ultimately not bold enough. Professor Alexander identifies a number of risks that progressives run in trying to turn public
choice analysis from the dark side of its "resoundingly antigovernment
and pro-market" orientation. 2 ' He challenges administrative law
scholars who seek a less impoverished conception of government to
look to theories of democratic politics-particularly, the work of
Jfirgen Habermas-that have currency in other academic disciplines.
Lisa Schultz Bressman, like Professor Spence, also tackles the difficult problem of delegation, extending her previous, insightful analysis of the subject.2 2 Although her Article approaches the subject from
the vantage point of the lawyer rather than the political scientist, the
portrait she paints of agencies has much in common with that of Professor Spence. 23 She agrees that agencies can, and often do, serve
public ends, and she would have administrative law reflect this optimism. At the same time, however, she worries that legal doctrine has
left regulatory policy makers largely free of the checks and balances
that attend important decisions in the rest of the American government. Nondelegation doctrine poses virtually no limit on Congress's
ability to assign policymaking responsibility to agencies and, in a postChevron world, agencies may experience only minimal judicial constraint on their ability to interpret their statutory prerogatives. With
neither Congress nor the courts reliably checking the scope of agency
policy discretion, Professor Bressman sees the logical remaining
source of limits as agency se/frestraint. Noting that the Court recently
rejected the idea that nondelegation doctrine could require agencies
to adopt self-limiting interpretations, 24 Professor Bressman argues
that ordinary administrative law can perform this function even if constitutional law will not. She reads the Court as implicitly endorsing
the idea that the Administrative Procedure Act, among other sources,
requires agencies to develop decisional standards and employ decisional protocols that will effectively cabin the exercise of their policymaking discretion. Insisting that the real determinant of whether
regulation serves democracy is how we discipline, rather than whetherwe
allow, delegation of power, Professor Bressman's analysis fits well with
a less cynical stance of cautious trust in the administrative state.
20
21

Gregory S. Alexander, Playing With Fire,87 CORNELL L. REv. 449 (2002).
Id.

22 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schecter Poultry at the Millenium: A DelegationDoctrinefor the
Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399 (2000).
23 Lisa Schultz Bressman, DiscipliningDelegation After Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass'ns, 87 ComEu L. RFv. 452 (2002).

24

See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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Mark Seidenfeld also focuses on the relationship between agency
decisionmakers and the courts, but from the perspective of the substantive quality of regulatory policy.25 His ambitious paper does nothing less than provide a new conceptual foundation for judicial review.
In contrast to the conventional public choice justification for judicial
review-i.e., checking, to some extent, agency capture by private interests-Professor Seidenfeld provides a basis for concluding that judicial review can accomplish precisely what courts say they are
doing-i.e., improving the quality of agency decisionmaking. Because
regulators are so much more experienced with the subject matter of
their decisions than judges, it is intuitively hard to see how review
could yield better regulation. Professor Seidenfeld, however, makes
the counterintuitive case by marshalling insights from cognitive psychological research. Psychologists have discovered that people, even
experts, sometimes rely on inappropriately simplistic decision rules
("heuristics") to make even the most important choices. However,
studies show, when people are told in advance that they will be expected to explain their decisionmaking process, reliance on error-inducing heuristics declines. Thus, Professor Seidenfeld argues, it is not
so much that judicial review itself provides quality control, as that regulators' knowledge of the probable need to justify their judgments alters the nature of their decisional process in ways that minimize
cognitive errors. For this reason, "hard look" review can indeed increase the rationality of the regulatory process. Professor Seidenfeld
goes on to explain how various decisional practices used by agencies
can be understood, from the cognitive psychological perspective, as
adaptations to produce better (i.e., less error-prone) choices. In so
doing, he implies a vision of administrative law in which the prime
objective of process is reducing human fallibility rather than checking
human cupidity, a vision in which courts and agencies could indeed
imagine themselves as partners rather than adversaries.
In our own Article, 26 we share Professor Seidenfeld's conclusions
about the capacity of judicial review to enhance regulatory decisionmaking. Our inquiry, however, paints with a broader brush. Like Professor Seidenfeld, we adopt a cognitive psychological perspective to
explore the idea that regulatory processes should be designed around
reducing human error rather than (as in the public choice perspective) defeating human greed. But, while he develops this idea with
richly detailed thoroughness in the particular area of judicial review,
we engage in a more preliminarily exploration across the range of
25 Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 486 (2002).
26 JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549 (2002).
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government institutions involved in regulatory policymaking. We propose that cognitive psychology can not only provide insights into the
causes of regulatory failure, but also can guide the institutional designer seeking structures and processes to minimize poor public policy choices. We examine the ways in which existing arrangements in
American government-including constitutional allocations of power,
statutory provisions for administrative process, and evolved practices
of institutional decisionmaking-map well onto a cognitive psychological model, and we offer suggestions for enhancing the capacity of
administrative government to generate good policy. Finally, we offer
several reasons why regulatory decisionmaking in a democracy would
likely improve-both in functionality and in perceived legitimacy-if
the dominant model of civic behavior were to feature the well-intentioned but fallible actor, rather than the unfailingly effective self-interest maximizer.
Displaying their customary intellectual synergy, William Eskridge
and John Ferejohn have provided Professor Seidenfeld and us with an
insightful analysis and extension of our work.2 7 To be sure, they have
reservations and criticisms of the applications of cognitive psychology
to public law. They worry that cognitive theory founders in legal
scholarship because it lacks a normative foundation and provides no
definitive account of human motivation (a point that has troubled
one of our other commentators, Sam Issacharoff, as well). Moreover,
echoing Terry Moe's emphasis on verifiability, they suggest that cognitive biases have sprouted "like weeds in an vacant lot," such that an
28
array of biases can be assembled to support virtually any position.
Nevertheless, Dean Eskridge and Professor Ferejohn effectively deploy
cognitive psychology to offer new insights into American government
institutions. For example, they note that the protection for minority
interests inherent in the Constitution might be seen as counteracting
the egocentricity bias of lawmakers-i.e., the tendency for the majority of the legislature to assume that their interests map well onto the
interests of the minority. 29 They also observe that a bicameral legislative system, with distinct election cycles for each house, is well suited
to counteract a number of cognitive biases that may produce unwise,
snap judgments by lawmakers. Interestingly, when it comes to the ju27 William N. Eskridge, Jr., &John Ferejohn, StructuringLawmaking to Reduce Cognitive
Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 616 (2002).
28 Id. at 633. Readers interested in these (and other) concerns can find them debated in a recent volume of the Cornell Law Review. See Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of
BehavioralDecision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L.
REv. 717 (2000); JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, The "New"Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 739 (2000).
29 This is a form of egocentricism that psychologists have taken to calling "naive realism." See Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, PsychologicalBarriers to Dispute Resolution, 27 ADvANcEs
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.

255, 278-84 (1995).
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dicial branch, they are far less persuaded than Professor Seidenfeld or
we that courts add value to the social regulatory enterprise. In particular, they point to a number of cognitive errors that have been
demonstrated to plague the decisionmaking process of juries and
even judges. 30 Despite (or perhaps because of) their sensible cautions, Dean Eskridge and Professor Ferejohn significantly advance the
introduction of cognitive analysis into public law.
In their Comment, Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman challenge a premise of much current administrative law scholarship including, perhaps, the papers in this Symposium-i.e., that there is
something seriously wrong with regulation. 3 1 Continuing Professor
Heinzerling's previous pathbreaking work,3 2 the Comment argues
that many claims of regulatory failure themselves fall to survive careful
scrutiny. It notes that some notorious examples of astronomically
costly and foolish regulations were in fact never adopted, while other
regulatory horror stories depend on incomplete assessment of
targeted risks or employ misleading discounting of future lives. This
Comment reveals how easy it is to sell American administrative government short, and warns that even allegedly less cynical accounts of
government too readily buy into the myths of regulatory failure.
Samuel Issacharoffs Comment notes a strong convergence in our
Article and in that of Professor Seidenfeld with other uses of cognitive
psychology in legal scholarship. 33 He places these papers within an
emerging line of scholarship that demonstrates that courts sometimes
have a sensible, intuitive grasp of psychological principles. Ever the
cautious consumer of social science however, 34 Professor Issacharoff is
wary of transporting cognitive analysis from the individualistic domain
of private law into the institution-dominated world of public law. He
points out that behavioral studies have focused almost exclusively on
the individual decisionmaker; to apply their insights to decisionmaking in complex institutional environments might be an unsupportable
leap. Predicting that psychologically based models will be most robust
in buttressing "the need for procedural order and accountability,"
Professor Issacharoff urges that those who would displace conven-

30
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 27; see also Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, &
AndrewJ. Wistrich, Inside theJudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777 (2001) (documenting
the effect of cognitive biases in judges).
31 Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory Movement,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 648 (2002).
32 Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatoiy Costs of Mythic Proportions,107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998).
33 Samuel Issacharoff, BehavioralDecision Theory in the Court of Public Law, 87 CORNELL
L. REV. 671 (2002).
34 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VANo.
L. REv. 1729 (1998).

HeinOnline -- 87 Cornell L. Rev. 276 2001-2002

GETTING BEYOND CYNICISM

2002]

tional analysis take small steps and (echoing Professor Levmore) incorporate the valuable insights that have come before.
The two brief Essays that close this volume are reflections on the
Symposium's theme by two of the most perceptive and influential
thinkers in contemporary administrative law scholarship.
Bringing to bear his exceptional capacity for creative synthesis,
Jerry Mashaw discerns a deep, dichotomous pattern in administrative
law theory and scholarship. 35 Scholars in the field, he suggests, tend
to belong to one of two cultures: realist or idealist. The realists view
government as "a competition among private interests" that produces
bargains that must be policed; the idealists view government as "a process by which public values are converted into legislative norms which
are then realized through administrative implementation."3 6 Each
culture has its own set of objectives, its own methodological orientation, and its own bites noires. Observing that these two ideological
camps often talk past each other, Professor Mashaw identifies the challenge for contemporary administrative law scholars as learning to
"bridge this intellectual chasm. '37 He suggests that very particular
types of intellectual flexibility must be cultivated to meet this challenge. First, scholars must be willing to "disaggregate and distinguish
intellectual tasks." 38 Because it is incredible that "any single perspective on the project of explaining, critiquing, or designing governance
structures" could successfully accomplish the several essential tasks of
combating corruption, enhancing performance, integrating regulatory institutions into our civic ideology, and creating a civic ideology
that sustains regulatory institutions, scholars must deliberately seek
out the methodological tool best suited for the particular task. Here
he joins Saul Levmore's call for more overt theoretical eclecticism.
The search for the best tool, however, requires us to cultivate a second
type of intellectual flexibility: the willingness to do the work needed to
get inside various methodologies and engage them with "both a sympathetic and a critical spirit."39 "If we are to be intellectual parasites,
40
as it seems we must be, we must be sophisticated and critical ones."
By committing ourselves to intellectual practices that allow meaningful dialogue across the divide, Professor Mashaw counsels, we truly begin to get beyond cynicism.
To many young administrative law scholars, Peter Strauss has
been an extraordinarily effective and generous mentor, managing to
35

(2002).
36
37

38
39
40

Jerry L. Mashaw, DeconstructingDebate, ReconstructingLaw, 87 CoRNELL L. REv. 682
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

683.
685.
687.
688.
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convey a deep faith in their ability while delivering a set of trenchant
suggestions for improvement. It seems fitting, then, that his Essay addresses the responsibilities of "rearing and educating the young."4'
Rejecting in particular Macey's razor, Professor Strauss deplores the
formalized dissemination of cynicism to law students, who tend to become less idealistic over the course of their legal education. This, of
course, enters perilous territory. It was not too many years ago that
Paul Carrington's essay condemning the nihilism of critical legal studies set off explosions across the intellectual community. 42 But Professor Strauss is not unmindful of the sensitivity of his topic. In an
allusion rich with irony, he summons up the shade of Socrates -(ostensible) progenitor of the distinctively legal pedagogy, to whom an
ungrateful community gave hemlock for corrupting its young. Obviously, human judgment on these things can be all too fallible. Still, he
challenges administrative law scholars to be mindful that their students may practice what they preach. And, respecting the call to empiricism made by Terry Moe and others, he points to an instructive
demonstration (conducted at Cornell University) that economics majors display less public-regarding behavior in interactive games than
do students of history, astronomy, or sociology. 4 3 He closes the Sym-

posium with the theme (developed in our Article as well) that scholars
should not delude themselves by thinking that, in academic theorizing, no one gets hurt. 44 If academics claim the right to propound

models of how government works, they should accept the responsibility for shaping the citizens who will go forth and govern.
Although we have identified some themes that emerged during
the Symposium, we do not purport to be able to distill an agreed-upon
group of next questions-let alone a set of determinate answers-in
the challenge of developing a robust non-cynical theory of the regulatory state. Indeed, reasonable minds could (and did) disagree on
whether getting beyond cynicism is a desirable goal. Several participants remarked, in varying ways, that the papers often seem like the
proverbial ships, passing in the night, but this strikes us as a confirmation rather than a concern. Where public law theorizing will go after
the first generation of legal public choice analyses is a wide open question. In the end, the next generation of theory will almost surely be
heavily determined by public choice-in the same way that post-struc41
42

Peter L. Strauss, EducatingCitizens, 87 CORNLL L. RaV. 690, 690 (2002).
See Paul D. Carrington, "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom,

35J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 9-12 (1985).
43
See Robert H. Frank et al., Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?, J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 1993, at 159.
44
See Nomination of Robert Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 100 Cong. 129, 130-31, 464-65 (1987)
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turalism rejected and built on the insights of structuralism, and postmodernism rejected and built on the insights of modernism. Perhaps
theory, like other forms of energy, can be neither created nor destroyed, but only transformed. The nature and direction of the transformation, however, is still very much up for grabs.
In light of this, one aspect of the Symposium seems especially
noteworthy. The participants trained in political science repeatedly
complained that their legal colleagues tend to treat public choice theory in a misleadingly reductionist way-to engage, as Terry Moe puts
it, in "stereotyp[ing] a very diverse body of work."45 This may be one
of the most intriguing and useful observations for public law scholars
trying to develop post-public choice theory.
To be sure, Jerry Mashaw, Dan Farber, Phil Frickey and other legal scholars who really know the political science literature have tried
to spread the word that public choice is a family of concepts and approaches, some more distantly related than others. 46 But it has remained the case that the public choice analysis deployed in legal
discussions of the regulatory state is almost universally true to
(stereo)type. To insist-as our colleagues trained in the social sciences do-that public choice theory need not involve either the strong
motivational assumption of self-interest or the reductionary premise of
perfect information and rationality, is to open up a range of questions
that have not thus far seriously engaged legal scholarship about regulatory government. For example, in what circumstances is it appropriate to use a variant of public choice theory designed to snuff out
corruption and rent-seeking rather than a variant that facilitates a
neo-progressive search for good government? When the motivational
assumption of material self-interest is relaxed, to what extent does the
remaining theoretical construct have predictive power or epistemological integrity?4 7 If, as Terry Moe and Saul Levmore insist, informed
practitioners know that public choice is not a universally apt theoretical tool, what are the parameters of its usefulness?
Once public choice theory is de-essentialized (to appropriate a
concept from a very different part of the intellectual spectrum), then
space is created for the kind of work thatJerry Mashaw urges administrative law scholars to undertake. The methodological decision to use
public choice analysis, as well as the selection among possible public
choice premises, will be recognized for precisely what they are: choices
that demand discussion and justification.
45

Moe, supra note 8, at 369.
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INTRODUGTION (1991); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
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47 See Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of
Occam's Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 109, 116 (2000); Rubin, supra note 5.
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